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Introduction
Globalization has become a "mantra" in the world today. Technological innovations
in communication and in transportation of people, money and goods, have extended
markets beyond national boundaries. After more than seven years of negotiations, the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT (1986/1994),
culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization -WTO, the legal and
institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system established on January 1, 1995.
The Uruguay Round, the seventh forum of negotiation since the GATT was
instituted in 1947, inter alia, reduces ordinary import barriers, sets up new mechanisms for
dispute resolution as well as guidelines for trading services and intellectual property. The
world has become small.
At the same time, against a background of open-border countries and global
markets, unfair trade practices, known as dumping also flourished. Indeed, dumping is
defined as the practice of using discriminatory price where the imports goods are sold at
prices below the selling price in the country of export and, consequently, causing injury to
competing industry in the importing country. In response to such a situation, mechanisms
of defense have been developed as tools to protect and prevent the nations from unfair
trade practices.
The GATT, since its original version of 1947, recognizes in Article VI anti-
dumping tariffs as a legitimate defense designed to protect domestic industries against
foreign predatory pricing strategies.
2This thesis focuses in the anti-dumping systems that arose in international trade
since the beginning of the twenty-century until the creation of the World Trade
Organization, with particular attention to developments in Brazil and in the United States.
Chapter 1 presents a historical analysis of dumping, discussing the origins,
classification, juridical nature and evolution in the international economy. Chapter 1 also
lays out distinctions between ordinary import duties erected in protectionist economic
policies, and defensive duties stemming from unfair trade practices.
Chapter 2 surveys the evolution of dumping and anti-dumping measures under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT. It analyses anti-dumping measures and
their applicability under Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties, as well as the evolution of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement, the so-called Antidumping Code,
since its first version in the Kennedy Round (the Fifteenth Supplement - May 1966-
Nov.1967), the second in the Tokyo Round (Twenty-Sixth Supplement - Nov 1978-
Nov.1979), and concluding in its current text established in the Uruguay Round in 1994.
Furthermore, this Chapter analyses some of the recent decisions taken in the Uruguay
Round that are related to the issue dumping, and the subsequent creation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the application of antidumping legislation in
Brazil, pointing to some of the legal problems that arose in that country especially for
enforcing retroactive duties under Article 10 of the Antidumping Code. It also surveys the
evolution of the domestic anti-dumping legislation.
Chapter 4 shows how the United States has dealt with the issue of dumping in this
century, covering the conflicts between domestic trade regulations and international
regulations set forth by the GATT. Chapter 4 also speculates on future changes that can be
expected in the United States international trade policies, considering that the WTO
agreements have now been approved by the U.S. Congress.
3Finally, this paper presents a personal view of the anti-dumping system officially
established by the World Trade Organization, and makes some suggestions for their
successful enforcement in the international trade.
Chapter 1
A - The Definition of Dumping
Dumping has been practiced long before the beginning of the twenty-century. As
observed by Jacob Viner, "(T)he practice of dumping has long been known, although not
by this name, to writers on commercial matters. Adam Smith, for example, not only
discusses unfavorably the practice on the part of government of stimulating exports at
prices lower than those current in the domestic market by the grant of official bounties, but
gives an instance from personal observation of the grant of bounties on exports by a private
combination of producers in order to reduce the supply available for the domestic market. 1 "
At that time, Smith was trying to implement his principle of "absolute advantage", fighting
against the mercantilist concept prevalent since the sixteenth-century, by which the wealth
of a nation was measured by the quantity of gold and silver (bullion) that a country had in
its treasure
2
. Smith showed that the wealth of a nation should be also measured by the
consumption alternatives available to the national citizens.
However, the term dumping first appears in economic literature at the beginning of
the twenty-century, although "it [dumping] had but a vague and uncertain meaning, and it
is still often used indiscriminately for such diverse price- practice as severe competition,
customs, undervaluation, bargain, sacrifice, or slaughter sales, local price-cutting, and
selling in one national market at a lower price than in another. 3" For instance, the English
economist T.E.G. Gregory points out four different definitions of dumping: "1) Sale at
prices below foreign market prices; 2) Sale at prices with which competitors cannot cope;
3) Sale at prices abroad which are lower than current home prices; and 4) Sale at prices
unremunerative to the sellers.4"
5The prevalent concept of dumping in modern international trade, however, is that
originated from price-discrimination in the basis defined in case 3 above, i.e., dumping
being characterized by a situation where the sales are made abroad at lower price than those
current domestic prices. Indeed, this is the definition for dumping that is established in
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 2 below.
As a matter of fact, price-discrimination is the key element in dumping. According
to classic economic theory, price-discrimination occurs when "a firm sells an identical
product in two different markets for different prices. 5" Whenever pricing discrimination
can be detected in trades between national markets, i.e., when the products are charged at
prices lower than the price in the export market, then a dumping practice should be
characterized.
There are scholars who argue that the phenomenon of dumping is more likely to
occur in developing countries6
,
where weaker domestic competition allows the dominant
oligarchies to impose high prices for their products, making the country, therefore, more
vulnareble to foreign competition.
However, until recently, the industries of developing countries have traditionally
been protected by high tariffs of ordinary import duties, the so-called prohibitive tariffs,
which makes the possibility of the entry of a dumped product less probable.
On the other hand, developed countries with lower trade barriers can be easy targets
for the oligarchic economies predominant in developing countries. Indeed, in developing
countries lower prices can be reached, for instance, by the so called "social dumping",
which means reducing the costs of production by the payment of very low wages to
workers. Also, many economies in developing countries normally are highly subsidized,
notably through the concession of significant privileges to special interest groups.
Therefore, domestic prices can be kept at a level that represents a compromise
between the low cost of production and the high value of the import duty imposed on the
same product. The effects of these practices on the domestic environment are surely
perverse and only favor the oligarchies: the industry loses efficiency, the domestic market
loses elasticity, the local consumers are forced to pay high prices for products, and the
government also loses substantial revenues that could come from reasonable import duties.
In addition, it is important to mention that in developing countries it is common to find
companies where the government is either the owner or has a substantial share in the
ownership. This at the least casts suspicion on the official local policies for the protection
of these same companies.
On the other hand, a developing country can achieve international competitive prices
in exporting its surplus by simply expurgating the local tariff barrier. Furthermore, it is
very unlikely that such a practice would be characterized as dumping abroad, on the
grounds that the entry of a product from a developing country into a highly competitive
developed country, seldom will result in damage to the local industry.
Therefore, the necessary causal link between dumping and injury, which satisfies
the characterization of dumping for the implementation of an anti-dumping tariff, will
probably not exist.
For various reasons, the implementation of such a mechanism by a developed
country is unlikely, due to the combination of high wages vis a vis low tariffs barriers
prevalent in competitive markets.
It is reasonable to assume, however, that the accentuated and widespread reduction
of tariffs that have occurred in the Uruguay Round of the GATT will make developing
countries significantly more vulnerable to dumping practices, if taken into consideration the
damage that massive imports from developed countries can bring to the local industries.
Notwithstanding the classic definition of dumping, some interesting forms of
dumping or quasi-dumping can be detected in the international trade environment, as for
instance:
Spurious Dumping
Spurious dumping should not be confused with genuine dumping. It is
characterized by a situation where the low price is brought about by an external and/or
artificial factor, caused by a legitimate market condition or by a fact independent of the
seller's intention. For example, when price-discrimination is a mere consequence of the
size of the combined foreign orders and/or from the conditions of pre-payment (cash) that
favor the seller when the goods are sold to the foreign instead of the domestic market.
These conditions represent logistic advantages perfectly justified by legitimate commercial
interests and, therefore, they do not represent an unfair trade practice that could characterize
dumping. 7 Then, the expression "price-discrimination" should give way to another one:
"Sales at different prices"
8
.
Exchange Dumping
This exists when the currency of a country presents "a substantial divergence
between its internal and its external purchasing power. 9" In this case, the simple
conversion from one currency to another makes a distortion which might point to the
presence of dumping. However, an intentional divergence between currencies can be
artificially created for the purpose of disguising dumping, and such a practice certainly can
be defined as unfair.
Freight Dumping
When favorable transportation costs, commonly offered in order to incentivate
exports, influence the price of a commodity "they somewhat resemble dumping. 10" This
practice can be defined as one favored by subsidies and, hence, may be resolved by
countervailing measures instead of anti-dumping ones.
Concealed Dumping
Concealed dumping is generally classified in the category of genuine dumping. It
occurs when there is "the charge of the same prices to purchases in different markets
although the conditions and terms of sale differ substantially as between the different
markets."" The main characteristic of this sort of praetiee is the intentional aet of
camouflaging aspects of the sale to hide the dumping 12 . A common form of concealed
dumping occurs, for instance, in the concession of much longer credit terms to certain
foreign buyers than to domestic ones without extra-charges.
In addition to these forms of dumping or quasi-dumping above mentioned,
there are other modern kinds of dumping, as follows:
Social Dumping
Social dumping has been the object of several complaints by developed countries.
It occurs when an abundant supply of labor results in very low wages and, therefore,
reducing production costs to the extent of creating a competitive advantage over prices of
developed countries. In the same category one can include the practice of utilizing labor
prison for the manufacture of goods, an issue that has made China the object of several
international objections.
Hidden Dumping by Associated Houses
Hidden dumping occurs "(I)n cases where there is no import price or where it
appears to the authorities concerned that the export price is unreliable because of association
or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party... 13".
Indirect Dumping
Occurs "in the case where goods are not imported directly from the country of
origin but are consigned to the country of importation from an intermediate territory... 14."
B - The Classification of Dumping
Jacob Viner summarizes the classification for dumping in a splendid charter that is
found in his book "Dumping - A Problem in International Trade} 5 ' Indeed, there he
divides the classification according to motive and to continuity of the dumping,
encompassing three categories of continuity: sporadic, short-run or intermittent, and long-
run or continuous.
9Then, we perceive that when dumping is sporadic it is either motivated by an
intention to dispose of a casual overstock, or it is an unintentional phenomenon.
If the dumping is classified as being a short-run or intermittent one, the motivation
for that can be either a) "to maintain connections in a market in which prices are on
remaining considerations unacceptable", or b) "to develop trade connections and buyers'
goodwill in a new market", or c) "to eliminate competition in the market dumped on", or d)
"to forestall the development of competition in the market dumped on", or e) "to retaliate
against dumping in the reverse direction."
Finally, if dumping is classified as long-run or continuous, the cause for that shall
be a) "to maintain full production from existing plants facilities without cutting domestic
prices", b) "to obtain the economies of larger-scale production without cutting domestic
prices", or c) "on purely mercantilistic grounds".
Although recognizing the unquestionable merits of the classification above
described, the fact of the matter is that the world trade market is something much more
dynamic and unpredictable. Consequently, it is perfectly possible, for instance, the
occurrence of a sporadic dumping motivated by purely mercantilistic grounds. Likewise,
an unintentional dumping can occur for an intermittent period. There may even be a
sporadic dumping originated by a kind of retaliation from another sporadic one. Indeed,
"(T)he economic rationale behind this (Viner) classification is not clearly stated" and
"(The) usual classification of dumping according to continuity/duration is therefore open to
a number of serious objections. 16"
Furthermore, due to the existing mechanisms which protect economies from
dumping practices, it is very unlikely that a long-run or continuous dumping can occur
without being repealed long before reaching such a category. However, these are economic
theories that actually escape from the purposes here pursued.
10
C - Dumping v. Ordinary Import Duties - Distinctions
The objective of this section is to make a clear distinction between the juridical
nature of the anti-dumping duties and the ordinary import duties, an issue that had a crucial
importance in Brazil in the early 1990', as will be seen in Chapter 3 below.
Backgound
Ordinary import duties were probably first applied in the sixteenth-century. At that
time, the predominant theory of mercantilism upheld the concept that the wealth of a
country was directly proportional to the quantity of gold and silver (bullion) that that
country had in its treasure. Mercantilism marks the beginning of the first ideas about
balance of trade, the so called "Balance of Trade Doctrine 17", which is probably the father
of the current concept of balance of payment. Consequently, the nations made huge efforts
to incentive the export of goods at any price, while at the same time that barriers were
created to block imports. These barriers simply prohibited imports altogether or
discourage them by the application of very high tariffs. These tariff barriers are the
forerunners of the ordinary import duty such as we know today.
Since then, the concept of import duties has evolved through out the centuries,
incorporating theories of eminent economists, as for instance, Adam Smith, David Ricardo,
and others. Nowadays, the majority of countries in the world recognizes that import duties
are part of the autonomous body of laws that integrates their national tax law 18 .
Contemporary thinking about the application of import duties recommends the
achievement of a delicate balance. The duty should be high enough to protect local
industry but, at the same time, low enough to allow the entry of foreign products into the
local market in order to stimulate competition, which is extremely healthy for the economy
in general. Also, an import duty applied at a reasonable level that would allow the entry of
foreign goods, represents a substantial and consistent source of revenue for the
government. Moreover, it is now generally accepted that "(P)rotection is not condemned
as being wholly wrong and frustrating to international exchange of goods, even by those
11
who believe in the ultimate benefit of free trade. Leaving aside seetional pressures for
protection for its own sake without consideration of the interests of the consumers, it is
admitted for instance that the one way to reduce the gap between the rich nations and the
poor nations is to encourage the poor nations to learn to use mechanical power in industry
to supply their needs and even to manufacture for export. 19
"
On the other hand, the motivation for the appearing of anti-dumping tariffs are
completely distinct from those that originated the ordinary import duty. The first concerns
about dumping practices took place after the Industrial Revolution, which started in
England in the final of the eighteen-century , and "it is therefore not surprising that the first
extensive charges of dumping were directed against her (British) manufactures. 20 ' For
instance "(S)oon after the Treaty of Ghent between England and the United States had
made possible a resumption of the trade relations which had been interrupted by the War of
1812, Americans accused English manufacturers of deliberately dumping their products in
the United States in order to crush the new industries which had developed there during the
war"
21
. Concerns about British unfair trade practices caused the United States to enact the
Tariff Act of 1816, which "was the first distinctly protectionist tariff of the United States,
and it has been claimed that the threat to American industries from English dumping, and
especially Brougham's (Henry Brougham was a member of the British House of
Commons) frank utterance with respect thereto, was an important influence contributing to
the enactment of this, as well as of subsequent, protectionist legislation. 22
"
However, it was in the early years of the twenty-century that "the growth of trusts
and combinations in industry has brought with it the systematic and more or less
continuous practice of export dumping on the part of many of the important manufacturing
industries of the great industrial nations, and especially on the part of such industries as
were organized into producers' trust or combination. 23" At that time, Germany was
repeatedly accused of exporting dumping through its kartells which were supported by
German industry, especially by the iron and steel sector, and there is a "general agreement
12
that before 1914 export dumping was more systematically practiced in Germany than any
other country.
24"
It was against this background that the first specific anti-dumping legislation was
enacted by Canada in 1904. In so doing, the Canadian government "found an ingenious
escape in the enactment of the anti-dumping law, which gave the manufacturers the specific
type of protection which they claimed they needed without ... an increase in the rates of
duty of the ordinary duty.25
"
Distinctions
As already mentioned before, ordinary import duties are an autonomous
body of laws that form part of the tax law of a country, and therefore they are created under
the principle of legality "to supply funds to the public authority, which decides unilaterally,
within the limits of its competence (ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione loci) as to the
amount and manner of distribution of the burden which it will impose (in ponere) on the
taxpayers.
26"
Anti-dumping tariffs, on the other hand, are beyond the legal definition of taxes,
on the grounds that, unlikely ordinary import duties, they are not an integral part of the
autonomous body of laws of a country. Indeed, while ordinary import duties are motivated
by protection of the domestic economy and supply of funds through revenues, the anti-
dumping tariffs are essentially punitive. Anti-dumping are, in fact, penalties which are
imposed through extraordinary custom duties, whenever the practice of dumping can be
identified. For instance, in the Brussels Sugar Convention signed in 1902 by Great Britain,
Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Spain and Sweden, the
adoption of countervailing measures against, the import of bounty-fed sugar were
contemplated in a "penal clause"27 .
While it is true that anti-dumping tariffs have aprotectionist effect their role is
primarily punitive. Indeed, the GATT allows that anti-dumping measures to remain in
force for a period of 5 years, as will be analyzed in Chapter 2. It means that, once a
13
dumping practice is detected, the penalty will be continuously applied for the subsequent
imports of the same product from the same exporter, independent of the new price that the
product can have after the penalty's imposition. Also, the extraordinary duty can be
applied continuously even though the dumping detected was classified as a sporadic one.
Consequently, the character of protection disappear from the anti-dumping tariff, giving
way to punitive action needed to inhibit unfair trade practices.
A frontal attack against the argument that the anti-dumping is applied as a
punishment is made on the grounds that the passive agent for the payment of the penalty is
the importer, and not the party who in fact practiced the dumping, i.e. the exporter. We do
not agree with this argument. First, although it is true that the importer pays the penalty, the
exporter will be indirectly punished by the loss of the market where the extra-duty is in
force, due to the high price that his product will reach after the addition of the tariff.
Second, there is always the possibility that the exporter and the importer being the same
company, in the event of a hidden dumping by associated houses, which is very common.
Third, it should consider an event of an anti-dumping being applied in the period between
the sale and the purchase of the goods. In this case the importer surely will cancel the
operation and its costs will probably be supported by the exporter.
Furthermore, a situation where the importer has to pay for the tariff it is not totally
unjust. Indeed, as an active member of the market, the importer knows that the product he
is buying has a price considerably lower than the usual prices. Then, he is undergoing a
calculated risk based on the relation of cost/benefit. In order to better explain this point-of
view, it could be compared with a situation where an investor makes an application in
investment funds. As much as the investor wants a quick and substantial return for his
investment, that much higher will be the risks he will have of losing everything; on the
other hand, if the investor wants only a fair remuneration for his money, the risk will be
practically non-existent.
14
Other strong elements in distinguishing ordinary duties (import tariffs) from
extraordinary eustom duties (anti-dumping tariff) is due to the faet that if the anti-dumping
tariff were considered as a tax it would constitute double-taxation (bis in idem), an evil
recognized by all tax systems in the world. Additionally, in such a situation the import duty
would be applied in a discriminatory manner, where the tax would be one rate for some and
a different one for others in regard to the same product, which is another big evil in the
environment of tax laws.
Also, ordinary import duties have been considered a matter of sovereignty of
nations. In spite of the fact that nowadays the duties are object of international concessions
through regional treaties, as NAFTA, MERCOSUL, European Community, APEC and
others, or international treaty, as the GATT, national sovereignty in fixing import duties
remains untouchable, on the grounds that these duties are part of the tax law of that
country. Conversely, the anti-dumping tariff must only be applied under the rules foreseen
in article VI of the GATT. Therefore, the decision of a country leading to the imposition of
anti-dumping tariffs can be always reviewed either by the courts of the same country under
Article 13 of the Antidumping Code, or by the WTO Dispute Settlement system under
Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT. In regard to the issue of sovereignty for the
purposes of anti-dumping, one can assume that the sovereignty is performed in a negative
way, i.e., when a government decides not to apply the penalty even though dumping has
been practiced and identified, on the grounds that such a decision can not be questioned.
Another piece of evidence, this time a factual one, can be used to emphasize the
distinction here pursued. At the present, the United States is conducting an investigation
regarding Mexican exports of fresh or chilled tomatoes a . As we know, the United States
and Mexico are member-states of the North-American Free Trade Act - NAFTA, a regional
treaty where, inter alia, preferential ordinary import duty were established. However, in
spite of this common partnership related to import duties, the United States is pursuing the
imposition of anti-dumping against Mexico, instead of seeking resort in the NAFTA
15
Treaty. I lere, once more, the character of punishment is prevalent over the principle of
protection that consecrates the ordinary import duty.
Indeed, in his book Dumping - A Problem In International Trade , Jacob Viner
several times refers to the anti-dumping as a penalty. For instance, in the chapter that
makes a comparative analysis of anti-dumping laws, he wrote that "...the imposition of
penalties on imports in case they are sold for export at f.o.b. prices or their equivalent
which are lower than the current fair market values for domestic sales in the country of
export", and yet "(T)he British law restricts the scope of the dumping penalty by making it
applicable only in case foreign goods are sold in Great Britain, c.i.f., at prices lower than
the fair market value in the country of export. 29" Interestingly enough the word "penalty"
is defined in the "American Heritage Dictionary" as "a punishment for a crime or offense"
In conclusion, one can assume that the anti-dumping tariff is an extraordinary
customs duty, by which a penalty is applied in order to punish an unfair trade practice.
Finally, it is opportune to distinguish dumping from export subsidies 30 . While
dumping is considered to be an unfair activity of a private enterprise, subsidies are granted
by governments to foster an exporting policy. The remedy for dumping is the
establishment of anti-dumping tariffs. The remedy for subsidies is the imposition of
countervailing measures. Nevertheless, it is true that the first measures against dumping in
the past century occurred in order to eliminate subsidies granted by governments. Two
considerations, therefore, have to be made: First, the fact that before the twenty-century,
the definition for dumping was very broad, as we pointed at the beginning of this Chapter,
and the concepts of dumping and subsidies were commonly interwined. Second, it is also
a fact that until the last century it was common for governments to have direct participation
and ownership in the enterprises, which makes a policy for concession of bounties at the
least suspect.
D - Anti-Dumping Laws Before GATT
Canada
Canada was the first country to introduce anti-dumping legislation. It was
introduced in 1904 by a Liberal government "in order to neutralize the aggressive campaign
of Canadian manufacturers for higher import duties on the plea that they were necessary to
protect Canadian Industry from dumping 31 . The measure was explained by the Minister of
Finance, W.S. Fielding, who said that "it was unscientific to meet special and temporary
cases of dumping by a general and permanent raising of the tariff wall and that the proper
method was the one which he now proposed, namely, to impose special duties upon
dumped goods. 32" The Canadian law, as amended in 1907, in classifying dumping
established those "...articles exported to Canada of a class or kind made or produced in
Canada, if the export or actual selling price to an importer in Canada is less than the fair
market value of the same article when sold for home consumption in the usual and ordinary
course in the country whence exported to Canada at the time of its exportation to
Canada... 33"
,
and the anti-dumping tariff was limited to the maximum to 15 per cent ad
valorem. Mr. Fielding explained the limitation "as conforming to the estimate that the
difference between the export price and the fair market value in exporting country of goods
dumped in Canada amounted on the average of 15 per cent. * " The concept of fair market
value is certainly the forerunner of the GATT's concept for normal value. For the
Canadian law, an unfair market value would be characterized whenever the difference
between the foreign domestic and the foreign export price exceeded 5 per cent 35 .
Another characteristic of the Canadian law is that "...the anti-dumping provisions
contained no injury test36", which is the necessary link between the dumping practice and
the damage that such a dumping causes in the local industry for the implementation of an
anti-dumping tariff, as foreseen in the GATT. The introduction of the injury test in Canada
occurred only in 1967, after the implementation of the 1967 GATT Antidumping Code 37 .
17
New Zealand
Following Canada, New Zealand implemented an anti-dumping law in 1905, the
Agricultural Implement Manufacture, Importation, and Sale Act, "in response to
complaints from domestic and British manufacturers of agricultural implements that an
American harvester trust was attempting to monopolize the New Zealand market by
systematic price-cutting to New Zealand purchasers... 38 ." It established a method by which
a bonus in the maximum limit of 33 percent was granted whenever it was necessary to
enable the local manufacturers to compete with the importers.
A new anti-dumping law was introduced in New Zealand in 1921, by which three
classes of imports were subject to anti-dumping tariff: "a) goods imported into New
Zealand of a class or kind produced in New Zealand, if the f.o.b. selling price to the
importer is less than the current domestic value in the country of export; b) goods imported
into New Zealand at a price which in the opinion of the Minister of Customs is less than the
cost of production, including a reasonable profit, in the country of origin or the country of
exportation at the time of exportation; c) goods imported into New Zealand of a class or
kind produced in New Zealand, or goods imported into New Zealand from a non-British
country of a class or kind produced in some other part of the British Empire, if the Minister
of Customs is satisfied that any special concession, whether by way of railway or shipping
freight, subsidy, special bounty, rebate, or otherwise, is given to such goods and that there
results from such concession injury to a New Zealand or British industry. 39"
Australia
Australia enacted its anti-dumping legislation in 1906, the Australian Industries
Preservation Act, "which was aimed chiefly at the suppression of monopolies, but which
also contained provisions dealing with dumping.40" It was characterized by a broad
definition for unfair competition that "not only covers dumping proper and selling below
costs of production, but it also applies to ordinary keen competition if it embarrasses
Australian industry. 41 "
In 1921, Australia enacted a supplementary legislation, the Tariff Board Act, that
"apparently does not repeal the earlier anti-dumping provisions in the 1906 law.42
'
France
France tried to implement an anti-dumping law in 1908, which had similarities with
and differences from the Canadian Law: "It resembled the Canadian law in the fundamental
particular that the additional duty was to be applied only to imports sold at prices lower than
those current in the exporting country. It differed, however, from the Canadian law in that
it was to apply only to instances of dumping resulting from the grant of export bounties,
that the amount of the bounty instead of the amount of difference between the domestic
price in the exporting country and the export price was to be the measure of the additional
duty, and that the application of the additional duty was not mandatory upon the customs
officials but was subject in each case to the discretion of the president and the Cabinet. 43
'
However, on the grounds that the implementation of the law as proposed would
implicate in a total revision of the French custom system, the government withdrew the
proposal without submitting it to a vote44 . Hence, "(I)n the revised tariff law as finally
enacted in 1910, there was inserted instead a bounty-countervailing duty of the ordinary
kind 45", i.e., to be calculated in the amount of the difference between the domestic price in
the exporting country and the export price.
Great Britain
The British anti-dumping law, the Safeguarding of Industries Act, was
implemented in 1921, and it reflected special concerns with Germany activities during
World War I and the post-armistice period 46 . The Act, established that if "foreign
manufactured goods of any class or description other than articles of food or drink are
being sold or offered for sale in the United Kingdom at prices below the cost of production
thereof as defined in the Act, and that by reason thereof employment in any industry in the
United Kingdom is being or likely to be serious affected, the Board (of Trade) may refer
the matter for inquiry to a committee constituted for the purposes of this part of the Act.47"
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The penalty in the British law was applied through "...a special duty equal to one-
third of their value, defined as the price in bond at the point of importation which an
importer would give for the goods. 48" Curiously, although the law characterizes dumping
on the grounds of a product sold below cost of production, "the Act has nothing to do with
cost of production and it is directed against imports sold in the United Kingdom at prices
below the foreign market price by more than 5 per cent, regardless of whether these prices
are below the cost of production.49"
However, the British Act also foresaw a complicated and bureaucratic system
before allowing the application of the anti-dumping duty. The following steps had to be
first accomplished: 50 a) a complaint to the Board Trade; b) an investigation by the Board;
c) a reference to a committee; d) a report by the committee; e) the drafting of an order by
the board; f) its submission to the House of Commons; g) the passage of a resolution by
the House; h) the issue of the order by the Board; and, finally, I) the administration of the
order by the commissioners of customs and excise. Therefore, it is not a surprise that
"(O)f 123 applications for the imposition of duties up to July 31, 1922, only four passed
through the Board and reached the House of Commons. 51 " Indeed, it can be said that
*'(A)s it stands today the anti-dumping section of the Safeguarding of Industries Act is of
little significance
.52"
The comments on the evolution of anti-dumping legislative measures in Brazil and
in the United States will be reserved for separate analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
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Chapter 2
A - The GATT/WTO
Origins and Evolution
For the last forty years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has
been the main instalment for the regulation of international trade. The GATT is the result
of a common effort among several countries to rebuild international world trade, which had
been disorganized and devastated during World War II l .
The idea of creating an International Trade Organization (ITO) capable of bringing
harmony into the market, was the corner stone of the meeting held between 1946 and 1948,
which is known as the "Havana Charter". However, the decisions emanating from the
Havana Charter never took efect, mainly because the United States failed to adopt the ITO
charter as conceived at the Havana meeting.
As a matter of fact, the roots of the GATT are due to a parallel action taken in order
to create a provisory agreement regulating the reduction of tariff barriers in international
trade that could be quickly enforced while the main instruments for the creation of the ITO
were being negotiated in the Havana Charter. The general idea was that such an agreement
could bring "suggestions for rules to govern trade barriers, restrictive business practices,
intergovernmental commodity arrangements, and the international aspects of domestic
employment policies, and also proposed a structure for the organization. 2"
After several meetings among representatives of governments of nineteen
countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, the GATT began to be
applied in January' 1, 1948, through a Protocol of Provisional Application. However, as
the Havana Charter never took effect, the GATT Agreement, that was supposed to be only
a protocol for provisory application, became the main instrument in the public law of
24
25
international trade for over 40 years \ Therefore, "the agreement, whieh started as a
temporary arrangement, has become a completely autonomous and self-sufficient entity.4"
In the GATT's preamble, the Contracting-States defined its objectives, stating that
by the GATT they were:
"Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods.
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. 5"
Since the GATT's creation, seven rounds of multilateral negotiations on tariffs and
trade barriers were held, as follow
6
:
"1
- Annecy, 1948-49, involving 33 countries.
2 - Torquay, England, 1950-51, involving 34 countries.
3 - Geneva, 1955-56, involving 22 countries and $2.5 billion of trade.
4 - The Dillon Round, Geneva, 1961-62, involving 45 countries and $4.9 billion of
trade.
5 - The Kennedy Round, Geneva, 1964-67, involving 48 countries and $40 billion of
trade.
6 - The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), involving 99 countries
and $155 billion of trade.
7 - The Uruguay Round of MTN, 1986-94, involving 125 countries and $3.7 trillion of
Trade."
The first five rounds dealt basically with reciprocal reductions in tariff rates.
However, it was in the Kennedy Round that the first version of the Agreement on
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Implementation of Artiele VI of the General Agreement, the so-called Antidumping Code,
was created. The sixth round, also known as Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), took
place in Tokyo in the late 1970 and, in addition to tariff reduction, produced some codes
establishing standards and procedures for the applicability of the General Agreement. The
last round, the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), brought to the GATT new issues, such as
trade in services, intellectual property and foreign investment, hitherto outside of the
GATT's sphere of application.
However, the principal achievement of the Uruguay Round was the creation, 40
years after the unsuccessful attempt through the Havana Charter, of the World Trade
Organization - WTO, the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trade system.
The WTO Framework
The creation of the WTO is established in the "Uruguay Round Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization"7 . In its Article II, the Agreement states that
"the Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1,2 and 3...," (the
so-called Multilateral Trade Agreements), "...are integral part of this Agreement, binding
on all members"8 . Therefore, among the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which are binding
on all GATT/WTO members, we find, inter alia, the "Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement" (the Antidumping Code), which will be carefully
analyzed in this Chapter.
Thus, the so-called Plurilateral Agreements (Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
and Agreement on Government Procurement) only bind "...those Members that have
accepted them,... 9"
Consequently, the GATTAVTO structure is composed of the following documents:
I - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (the GATT Agreement);
II - Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations;
III - Uruguay Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization;
IV - Uruguay Round Multilateral Agreements on Trade and Goods;
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V - Uruguay Round General Agreement on Trade in Serviees;
VI - Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade Related Aspeets of Intellectual Property Rights;
VII - Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Proeedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes;
VIII - Uruguay Round Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
The multilateral agreements, eleven in number 10
,
are an integral part of the
Uruguay Round Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods.
In conclusion, the former GATT Agreement (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1947) became only one, but without doubt the most important, of the agreements that
compound the general structure of the GATT.
B- Article VI of the GATT
The provisions for the determination of dumping and for the application of anti-
dumping tariff and countervailing duties were originally established together in Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947. As we have already mentioned,
anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures are two different concepts " and
,
coherent with the purpose of this thesis, the analysis will focus only on the issue anti-
dumping.
At first sight, Paragraph 1 of Article VI leads to the conclusion that, for the GATT
purposes, the practice of dumping is not considered illegal or unfair "per se". Indeed,
Paragraph 1 establishes that "(T)he contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which
products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than
the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury
to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry." Therefore, the wrong to be condemned is not the
dumping itself, but the material injury that it causes or threatens to cause to a domestic
industry. Paragraph 1 also clarifies the definition for "normal value", which is considered
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"...the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country,...". In the absence of such a domestic
price, the normal value will be determined by "the highest comparable price for the like
product for export to any third country...", or "the cost of production of the product in the
country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling costs and profit."
Paragraph 2 establishes parameters for the imposition of anti-dumping tariffs,
which cannot be "greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such
product." Hence, the "margin of dumping" must be determined by the difference between
the export price and the normal value, as considered in Paragrah 1. Therefore, it becomes
clear that there is no room for the imposition of barriers other than tariffs, which means
that, consistent with the GATT's spirit 12
, the imposition of quantitative restrictions
(quotas) are prohibited and cannot be applied to remedy dumping. The other Paragraphs in
Article VI, either deal with countervailing measures, or with less important regulations that
are not relevant for the purpose of this analysis.
As a matter of fact, given the generic language adopted, the provisions of Article
VI, "which were designed to accommodate the U.S. domestic antidumping law, frequently
lack precision and specificity, 13" and the "antidumping duties had received little attention
from the Contracting Parties 14>>
C - The Antidumping Code - Evolution
The Kennedy Round
It was in the Kennedy Round 15 that "the dumping question came to life 16" , through
the creation of the "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade n ", hereinafter referred to as the Antidumping Code. At that time,
there was general dissatisfaction among the signatories of the GATT with "certain practices
of other countries. 18"
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As a matter of fact, the lack of details in Article VI allowed the members to form
diferent interpretations that could favor them in applying the penalties. The Canadian anti-
dumping law, for instance, was inconsistent on the grounds that "it did not require a
finding of injury as a prerequisite to the imposition of antidumping duties. 19'' In the United
Kingdom, "anti-dumping duties could be imposed without notice and without opportunity
for the parties to be heard. 20
"
Furthermore, "(A)lthough the U.S. antidumping statute required findings both that
import sales were being made at below fair value and that injury to domestic industry was
resulting therefrom, the established procedures called for withholding appraisement of the
goods in question following a tentative Treasury Department finding of below fair value
sales without any finding as to injury. 21 "
Actually, Article VI of the GATT "was signed conditionally, i.e., subject to existing
legislation and practice 22", the so-called Grandfather clause. Therefore, a specific
agreement that could eliminate the broad language existent in Article VI and at the same time
bring detailed and elucidative provisions for the application of the anti-dumping tariffs was
extremely necessary.
Additionally, in spite of the fact that the anti-dumping and countervailing duties
were included in the same Article VI of the GATT, the Antidumping Code was specific for
the regulation of anti-dumping, i.e., "...no countervailing duty code came out of the
Kennedy Round to take its place beside the Antidumping Code23".
The Antidumping Code brings in its original version 17 articles24
,
and it seeks
basically the elimination of ambiguities related to Article VI of the GATT, establishing
detailed procedures for the application of anti-dumping duties.
Article 2 of the Code states the principles for the finding of dumping. It clarifies,
inter alia, the meaning of like product , which "...shall be interpretated to mean a product
which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the
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absence of such a product, another product which, altough not alike in all respects, has
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration. 25
'
Article 3 establishes the rules for the determination of injury to the domestic
industry. Article 4 brings the definition of industry. In Articles 5 and 6 we find the
necessary procedures for the investigation and gathering of evidence. Articles 8 and 9 deal
with how to impose and collect anti-dumping duties. Articles 10 and 1 1 deal with the
application of provisional measures and retroactivity of the effects of anti-dumping duties,
which we consider as the two most powerful weapons in the Code to inhibit the practice of
dumping 26 . Procedures related with the application of anti-dumping on behalf of a thrird
country are found in Article 12. Article 17 established a "Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices", to be composed by representants of the contracting parties.
Interestingly, in the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code there was no prevision for
judicial review of the decisions taken by the members establishing anti-dumping penalties.
The Kennedy Round Antidumping Code became operative on July 1, 1968.
Unfortunelly, its practical effect was impaired since the U.S. Congress "failed to
implement it into U.S. law. 27"
The Tokyo Round
The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations "received its name from the largely
coincidental event that its origins occurred at the GATT meeting of Ministers held in Tokyo
in September 1973. 28"
The main amendment introduced in the Antidumping Code in the Tokyo Round is a
new Article 13 29
,
where special treatment to less developed countries (LDCs) is granted.
The LDCs "had a particular amendment. ..which provided that because of the unique
situation of LDCs, the value for determining whether goods from an LDC are being
dumped should determined by a comparison of the export price from the export country
with the price of a like product when exported to a third country. 30" After exhaustive
negotiation, the participants finally agreed to give special treatment to less developing
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countries, and it "included a recognition that for LDCs the base for calculating dumping
margins would be the price of comparable exports to third countries or the cost of
production, rather than simply the price that the product is exported to the country alleging
dumping. 31 "
Another significant inovation in the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code "was its
requirements that antidumping investigation be reported to, and a semi-annual report on
antidumping cases be transmited to, the GATT Secretariat. 32"
This Antidumping Code took effect in January 1, 1980, and, "unlike its
predecessor, The Tokyo Round Antidumping Code was implemented into U.S. law -
Congress did so through Section 2 (a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 33
D - The Uruguay Round and the Current Code
In The Uruguay Round the Antidumping Code was substantially revised. Among
the main improvements the "...Agreement provides for great clarity and more detailed rules
in relation to the method of determining that a product is dumped, the criteria to be taken
into account in a determination that dumped imports cause injury to a domestic industry, the
procedures to be followed in initiating and conducting anti-dumping investigations, and the
implementation and duration of anti-dumping measures. 34"
The Uruguay Round Antidumping Code establishes a methodology for determining
dumping, such as the "...criteria for allocating costs when the export price is compared
with a constructed normal value and rules to ensure that a fair competition is made between
the export price and the normal value of a product so as not to arbitrarily create or inflate
margins of dumping. 35"
Further, the Agreement "strengthens the requirement for the importing country to
establish a clear causal relationship between dumped imports and injury to the domestic
industry", and "confirms the existent interpretation of the term domestic industry. 36"
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Other relevant improvements, are:
a) Procedures to establish how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated and how such
investigations have to be conducted, ensuring that "...all interested parties are given an
opportunity to present evidence... 37 '' Therefore, the Agreement "calls for prompt and
detailed notification of all preliminary or final anti-dumping action to a Committee on Anti
Dumping Practices", the "parties (shall have) the opportunity of consulting on any matter
relating to the operation of the agreement or the furtherance of its objectives, and to request
the establishement of panels to examine disputes. 38"
b) A new proviso on application of provisional measures establishes that "anti-dumping
measures shall expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a determination is made
that, in the event of termination of the measures, dumping and injury would be likely to
continue or recur.
c) The Code presents a new Article 13, establishing domestic judicial review "of
administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determination...40" of
anti-dumping measures, which reinforce the concept that a decision taken by the authorities
of a country determining the application of anti-dumping measures cannot be considered as
a sovereign decision or an Act of State.
d) The Antidumping Code also introduces a new Article 17, Consultation and Dispute
Settlement, by which decisions taken under the Code are also subject to the procedures in
the DSU - Dispute Settlement Understandings foreseen in The Uruguay Round
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing The Settlement of Disputes41 . This
Article 17 will be analyzed separately.
Thus, in its current version, the Antidumping Code presents eighteen articles and
two annexes.
Annex I provides "Procedures for On-The-Spot Investigations Pursuant to
Paragraph 7 of Article 6
42
", which deals with procedures for the notification of the
exporting countries that an anti-dumping investigation has been initiated and for the
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gathering of evidence in the territory of other GATT members, including standard
provisions for the visit of firms abroad by governmental or non-governmental experts of
the importing country.
Annex 2, "Best Information Avaiable...", is also related to the issue "gathering of
evidence", and it makes clear that "...if the information is not supplied within a reasonable
time, the authorities will be free to make determinations on the basis of the facts available,
including those contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation by the
domestic industry.43"
As mentioned before, we understand that the provisions in Articles 7 "Provisional
Measures" and 10 "Retroactivity" are fundamental weapons for the inhibition of dumping,
which is, without doubt, the main purpose of Article VI of the General Agreement and the
Antidumping Code, since the principal objective of the GATT is to prevent dumping, rather
than to punish it. Therefore, we will now proceed to a detailed analysis of these two
articles.
Article 7 - Provisional Measures
In Article 7 Paragraph 1 , the Code presents the circumstances where provisional
measures can be applied. Then, three possibilities justify and allow its application: "(i) an
nvestigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a public
notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given adequate
opportunities to submit information and make comments; (ii) a preliminary affirmative
determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry; and
(iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused
during the investigation. 44".
It seems important to mention that the findings of the practice of dumping and the
injury to the domestic industry must be determined preliminarily to the application of
provisional measures, and these are the reasons by which the Code allows its application
only 60 days after the date of the begining of the investigation. Therefore, the Code
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assumes that a preliminary investigation cannot be eonelusive in a period shorter than 60
days.
Paragraph 2 establishes that a provisional measure "may take the form of a
provisional duty or, preferably, a security -by cash or bond- equal to the amount of the
anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated, being not greater than the provisionally
estimated margin of dumping. 45" It also allow the withholding of appraisement, providing
that it "is subject to the same conditions as other provisional measures.46"
Paragraph 4 limits the application of provisional measures to a period of four
months, which can be extended to six mounths "...upon request by exporters representing
a significant percentage of the trade involved...
47
". Interestingly enough, it is hard to
imagine a situation where the exporter himself asks for the extension of the period of
application of provisory penalties and it is very probable that it has never occurred.
Also, if the authorities decide that the application of a "duty lower than the margin of
dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may be six and nine months,
respectively.
48"
Article 10 - Retroactivity
Article 10 is surely the most powerful instrument to prevent dumping during the
period after an investigation of dumping has started. It creates exceptions by which the
applicability of penalties can retroact for the period that antecedes the decision for the
imposition of definitive or provisional anti-dumping measures.
Paragraph 2 states that "Were a final determination of injury (but not of a threat
thereof or of a material retardation of the establishment of an industry) is made...", then
"antidumping duties may be levied retroactivelly for the period for which provisional
measures, if any, have been applied. 49"
Therefore, the retroactivity does not ever apply, in cases of retardation of the
establishment of an industry, though it can be applied when "... a final determination of a
threat of injury, where the effect of the dumped imports would, in the absence of the
35
provisional measures, have led to a determination of injury,...
50
". Consequently, it is
possible that the effects of anti-dumping duties can be applied retroactivelly to imports that
occurred in the period of two months after the begining of the investigation.
It is evident that such a retroactivity will not apply over the period when provisional
measures are in force, whenever the definitive duty is decided to be in the same amount of
that duty applied through provisional measures. However, if there is a difference between
definitive and provisory duties an adjustment has to be made, either by restitution to the
importer of the value paid in excess (whenever the definitive duty is fixed in a lower value
than the value fixed for the provisional measure), or by the levy of the remainder in debt (in
case that the definitive duty is higher than the provisory duty).
Notwithstanding Paragraph 2, Paragraph 6 foresees the extension of the period of
retroactivity in special cases for the products which entered 90 days prior to the date of
application of provisional measures, provided that
:
"i) there is a history of dumping which caused injury or that the importer was, or should
have been, aware that the exporter practises dumping and that such dumping would cause
injury, and
(ii) the injury is caused by massive dumped imports of a product in a relatively short time
which in light of the timing and the volume of the dumped imports.. .is likely to seriously
undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied, provided
that the importers concerned have been given an opportunity to comment. 51 "
Therefore, considering the fact that a provisional measure can be applied 60 days
after the start of the investigation, and that the retroactive effect can cover the period of 90
days prior to the application of provisional measures, one can assume that it would be
technically possible that an anti-dumping duty be applied for a period up to 30 days before
the begining of the investigation. However, Paragraph 8 limits the period for imposition of
retroactive effects when it states that "(N)o duties shall be levied retroactively pursuant to
Paragraph 6 on products entered for consumption prior to the date of initiation of the
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investigation.
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" Then, in its maximum extension, retroaetivity ean cover the whole period
while the investigation is taking place.
Actually, the fact of the matter is that the language adopted in (i) above is extremely
subjective, on the grounds that one can always argue that the importer, at least, "should
have been" aware that the products were being dumped into the country. Further, as we
already mentioned in Chapter 1, it is very improbable that the importer, as an active
member in the market, was not aware that the goods were being introduced into the country
under dumped prices. Indeed, given the facilities of communication and the dinamic
exchange of data that are available nowadays, such a hipothesis can hardly be considered.
Also, it has to be considered that an investigative process of dumping practices is
invariably very expensive, since evidence must be gathered abroad, and it is very dificult to
imagine the initiation of a process if the requirements foreseen in (ii) are not met. Hence,
one can assume that, whenever a country decides to apply definitive anti-dumping
measures, retroactivity effects are always likely to be applied.
Another article of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code, the 17th, deserves
special attention, and we will proceed, also, to a separate analysis of the mechanisms for
dispute settlement under the Antidumping Code.
Article 17 - Consultation and Dispute Settlement
Traditionally,
5 3
the principal objective of the GATT in matters of dispute settlement
procedures "is not to decide who is right and who is wrong, or to determine a State's
responsability in the matter, but to proceed in such a way that even important violations are
only temporary and are terminated as quickly as possible. 54" Therefore, "(T)he
development of an understanding between the parties - of a mutually acceptable solution - is
the main objective of the dispute settlement procedure. 55"
Paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code states that "the
Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to consultations and the settlement of
disputes under this Agreement. 56" It means that whenever a contracting-party decides for
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the imposition of anti-dumping duties, definitive or provisional, such a decision can be
addressed for review by the WTO, by utilization of the rules established in the "Uruguay
Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes57",
hereinafter referred to as the DSU Agreement.
The role played by the DSU Agreement, on the other hand, is to regulate the
mechanisms and procedures for the application of Articles XXII (Consultation) and XXIII
(Nullification or Impairment) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Therefore, in
sending dumping matters to be settled under the DSU Agreement, Article 17, Paragraph 1
of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code clarifies the link between Article VI (Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties) and Articles XXII and XXIII of the General
Agreement. In other words, "...the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement operates in
tandem with the DSU. 58"
Unlike the situation existent before the Uruguay Round59
,
through the procedures
established in the DSU Agreement, the adoption of a panel report by the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) cannot be blocked by the losing party, and it "is significant because
adoption is the key prerequisite for the establishment of legal obligations incumbent in a
losing party.
60"
Article 17, Paragraph 2 points out that each GATT Member "shall afford sympatetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding,
representations made by another Member with respect to any matter affecting the operation
of this Agreement. 61 " It means that whenever a Member A makes a representation to clarify
the imposition of anti-dumping penalties by a Member B, Member B must show at least
good-will in seeking a "...mutually satisfactory resolution...62"
Nevertheless, if the parties failed to "...achieve a mutually agreed solution,..."63
,
and a definitive anti-dumping duty was applied, then the aggrieved Member can send the
matter to be decided by the DSB. The same mechanism is applicable when the imposition
of provisional measures was taken, but it is necessary that such an imposition produces a
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"significant impact, and the Member that requested provisional consultations considers that
the measure was taken contrary to the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 1 ,..
M '
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 states the prerequisites for the application of provisional matters.
Paragraph 5 provides that the WTO panel will be based on the "facts made available
in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing
Member.65 ' This provision seems to make applicable for the procedures of gathering the
evidence to be analyzed by the WTO panel the Annex II of the Antidumping Code, "Best
Information Available".
Interestingly, the DSU Agreement establishes in its Article 16.4 that "... the
(WTO) report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally
notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
report.
66"
However, Article 17 Paragraph 6 of the Antidumping Code recognizes a situation
where the acceptance of a panel report will not necessarily be mandatory. Indeed,
Paragraph 6 states that "...(W)here the panel finds that a relevant provision of the
Agreement admits more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the
authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations. 67" Thus, whenever more than one interpretation is possible,
the decision taken by a Member to impose anti-dumping measures cannot be questioned,
even if the panel reaches a different conclusion.
It is important to mention that such an exception for the acceptance of a WTO
report, which is applicable "...only to antidumping disputes... 68", opens a wide door for
discussion, given the subjectivism that the issue "interpretation" can bring. In fact, the
interpretation of something (a law or a fact) is the main foundation on which the legal
system is built. Indeed, it is unimaginable in the legal world, for instance, that a decision
taken by a court or tribunal could be questioned (in any other way than by a legal appeal)
on the grounds that one understands that more than one interpretation can be found. In
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creating such an exception for the application of a panel report, the WTO deliberately
weakened its dispute settlement system. As a matter of fact, it creates a fertile field for
argumentation by clever lawyers, who always can find different interpretation in anything
whatsoever. As an inevitable result, such a provision incetivates protectionist practices in
the adoption of anti-dumping measures, at the same time that it retards the implementation
of uniform and arbitrated solutions that can be brought by the WTO.
Nevertheless, Articles 21 (Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendation and
Rulings) and 22 (Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions) of the DSU
Agreement 69 , establish the procedures and remedies for the enforcement of the WTO panel
reports. If a Member fails to adopt a WTO decision, then the aggrieved Member can
unilaterally retaliate through suspension of concessions or other trade benefits, observed
the over-retaliation limitations set forth in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of the DSU
Agreement70 . Further, in Paragraph 8 is determined that "(T)he suspension of concessions
or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the
Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the
nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.71"
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Chapter 3
A - Dumping in Brazil
Historical Background
The incorporation of anti-dumping laws in Brazilian legislation occurred very
recently. In spite of the fact that Brazil was an original member of the GAIT 1947, it was
only in 1987 that the Brazilian Congress promulgated the first specific anti-dumping
legislation, i.e., 40 years after the creation of the GATT, and 20 years after the enactment
of the first Antidumping Code in the Kennedy Round.
Indeed, the first anti-dumping law in Brazil was introduced by virtually translating
into Brazilian law the Antidumping Code adopted in the Tokyo Round(1979), through the
Decreto 93.941, of January 16, 1987. However, before we comment on the Brazilian
law, and in order to better understand the evolution of protectionist policies in Brazil, it is
necessary to conduct a brief survey in the country's history, since the last century.
Until 1822, the year in which Brazil became independent from Portugal, and also
during the decades that followed its independence, Portugal kept a total monopoly of all
Brazilian foreign commerce, which was centralized on the exports of coffee 1 . At that time,
Brazil was basically an importing country and unlike what occurred in the United States,
after its independence Brazil did not have the political and economic power to fight against
unfair practices of trade by developed countries2 . The reasons for that can be explained by
the Portuguese effort to prevent the establishment of industries in Brazil and, therefore, to
keep its ex-colony economically dependent on Portugal even after 1822.
Consequently, the evolution of the protectionist policies in the country started in the
1 880s and ran parallel to an effort for the substitution of imports, which can be divided into
distinct periods 3 .
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First Period (1885-1918)
The first attempt of industrialization in Brazil occurred between 1885-1890, through
an orchestrated effort to develop the textile industry of cotton. Indeed, in 1890 Brazilian
industry was able to supply 60 per cent of the domestic demand for cotton4 .
A survey made in 1917, showed that 80 per cent of the industry in the State of Sao
Paulo, the most developed state in Brazil, was composed of former textile industries and,
in 1900, the Brazilian industry was already strongly protected by prohibitive import
duties 5 .
Additionally the policy for the substitution of imports was highly influenced by a
depreciation of the Brazilian currency that occurred in the same period, which increased
substantially the prices of import goods. Therefore, at the same time that consumption was
automatically directed to national products, investments were directed into national
production 6 .
Second Period (1918-1945)
Even considering the fact that the lower cost of labor favored the process of
industrialization in Brazil, its industrial production at the beginning of this century could be
considered as limited and unsophisticated, on the grounds that it was mainly based on the
exploitation of agricultural products.
However, despite the effort to implement the growth of the economy through its
exports, a model adopted by all developed countries, Brazilian exports were limited to
primary products, such as coffee and cotton, and the expansion of the domestic market was
dependent on the success of the exports7 .
On the other hand, as the Brazilian import duties were not established under "ad
valorem" criteria, a gradual inflation of the local currency brought a continuous devaluation
of the tariff barriers, and without protection national products began to lose market to
imported goods8 .
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This period of difficulties prevailed until 1930, when the "Great Depression"
occurred. The most important impact of the Great Depression in Brazil was the immediate
decrease of Brazilian exports and, consequently, it again forced the government to establish
protectionist measures, such as the implementation of high import duties and the rigid
control of the exchange of currencies9 . These measures started a new period for the
substitution of imports in the country, and one can assume that the real process of
industrialization in Brazil started in 1930, ironically invigorated by the depression
experienced in the United States 10 .
Third Period (1945-1980)
In the period post-World War II, the international trade scenario was extremely
favorable for the implementation of substitution of import policies in Brazil. On the one
hand, the export of primary products was favored by high prices and large foreign demand,
which could produce the accumulation of reserves in the Brazilian treasury. On the other
hand, the difficulties of imports led the country to pursue technological development 11 .
However, the opportunity was lost due to a wrongful exchange rate policy, in which the
rates were kept fixed despite the continuous inflation of the national currency.
Consequently, the reserves were continuously lessened, which significantly obstructed the
diversification of the industrial process 12 .
Nevertheless, it was in 1957 that a fundamental law for the improvement of the
national industry was promulgated. Law 3.244 gave discretionary power to the CPA-
Comissdo de Politica Adiianeira (Customs Policy Commission) to fix, change or suspend
import duties, whenever it was necessary to protect domestic industry.
As a result, Law 3.244, inter alia, increased the entry of foreign investments in
Brazil, as a direct response to a new acknowledgement that the industry was then being
protected rationally 13 .
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It is important to point out that Law 3.244 mentioned for the first time in the history
of the Brazilian legislation the word "dumping". Indeed, in Paragraph 2 of Article 3, the
law established that in case of dumping practices, the import duty would be elevated to a
limit that could neutralize the dumping.
However, it is possible to observe that, unlike the anti-dumping legislation
dominant at that time in the world 14 , the neutralization of dumping in Brazil was made
through a mechanism to increase the ordinary import duties, rather than by the imposition
of a penalty that should be established in a specific anti-dumping legislation.
Such a criteria seems to have created a culture that would lead to future
misunderstanding, as we will see below during the analysis of the recent problems
experienced in Brazil for the application of retroactive effects of anti-dumping duties, as
foreseen in the GATT Antidumping Code.
Therefore, by the system adopted in Law 3.244 the system of protection was good
enough not only to prevent dumping, but also to protect the national industry from the
import of specific goods whenever necessary, independent of the occurrence of unfair
practices of trade 15 .
In 1964 armed forces took the power in Brazil, establishing a military dictatorship
that lasted for more than 20 years. The first phase of this period was marked by a strong
nationalism, in which the government launched a monumental effort to develop industry
through the import of technology from abroad. It was in this period, for instance, that
Brazil initiated a strong program for the substitution of imports 16
,
through the development
of energy-generating projects (hydroelectric, nuclear energy), transports (Trans-Amazon
Highway
, Iron Railroad), and through heavy investments in industry in general
(petrochemical, paper and cellulose, metallurgy 17).
This was the so-called "Brazilian Miracle". Nationalistic slogans were spread all
over the country, such as "The Oil is Ours", which was utilized to justify the governmental
monopoly in the exploitation and distribution of oil, or "Brazil, Love it or Leave it", which
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made so many important intellectuals and scientists flee from the country. 1 lowever, as a
consequence of such a policy, the foreign debt increased significantly and, until now, has
been one of the most complex problems for the development of the country.
At that time, Brazil was not much concerned with dumping, given the prohibitive
tariff barriers by which the new "miraculous" industries were being entirely protected from
competitive industries abroad.
The second period started with the first "oil crisis" in 1973, which encountered in
Brazil a country completely unprepared to face international competition 18 . This period was
characterized by the so-called implementation of a "relative democracy 19" in Brazil, which
started under the presidency of General Geisel in 1974 as a response to international
pressures for the return of human rights guarantees in Brazil. At that time, the rate of
growth in Brazil was roughly 7 per cent a year, and the problems in the balance of
payments were increasing very fast, due to the high level of the foreign debt.
However, although the whole developed world was suffering the effects of the oil
crisis and the countries were, therefore, providing adjustments in their economies, Brazil
opted for a policy of accommodation, and continued its growth through mechanisms for the
substitution of imports and a search for foreign financing20 . Hence, in the middle of a
world crisis scenario, Brazil started a strong industrial program for the substitution of
imports21 .
The same accommodation was observed in the second oil crisis in 1980, a year in
which Brazil had a rate of growth of 8,2 per cent22 . The result of such a policy was
necessarily disastrous, and in 1981 Brazil submerged into a period of deep recession.
Consequently, efforts were directed to an emergence export policy large enough to generate
resources directed to the payment of the foreign debt.
Economists in Brazil have called de 1980s "the lost decade", and this period was
characterized by a total stagnation of the economy, high rates of inflation, increase of
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poverty, and by a complete incapacity to keep up to date the payment of the external debt.
Brazil was paying the price for its "miracle".
Obviously, no dumping concerns were present during the substitution of imports
program in Brazil, which was guaranteed by the protectionist policy of imposing import
duties on a level high enough to keep international competition far from its borders.
The Current Situation
With the return to the democratic system in 1985, the main concern of the national
industry was to prepare itself to face international competition. On the one hand, it was
extremely necessary to achieve of high levels of quality in order to grant the access of
national products into the international market, which was at that time more and more
competitive mainly due to the aggressive presence of the Asiatic Tigers.
On the other hand, the opening of Brazilian borders through the lowering of the
ordinary import duties was unavoidable. Furthermore, it is important to mention that in the
late 80s Brazil was participating in the GATT Uruguay Round, where reciprocal
compromises for the reduction of import duties were taking place among the GATT
members.
Domestic industry, then, started a monumental effort to modernize itself, applying
international know-how to the management and organization of national companies. These
modern technical concepts, such as "down sizing", "just in time", "re-engineering",
"quality control", and others, were imported mainly from the United States and Japan.
Globalization had already become the corner-stone of world commerce. However, it was
only in 1990, under the presidency of Collor de Mello23
,
that a program for the reduction of
import duties took effect.
In 1994 Brazil elected President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a liberal-democrat
who has not only continued but has also improved the effort to make of Brazil a free-trade
country.
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Another element that favored the strengthening of Brazilian international commerce
was the advent of the MERCOSUL (Treaty of Asuncion), the customs union agreement
establishing a free-trade area among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.
B - The Brazilian Anti-Dumping Law
Decreto 93.941
On January 16,1987 the Brazilian Congress promulgated the Decreto 93.941
(Acordo Antidumping), which adopted into the Brazilian Law the Agreement on
implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
Antidumping Code, as conceived in the Tokyo Round24 .
As a matter of historical curiosity, we point out that the first imposition of anti-
dumping penalties in Brazil occurred in 1989, when the imports of bicycle chains'
transmission from China, USSR, India and Czechoslovakia25 were penalized with anti-
dumping duties.
However, it was only after 1990 that anti-dumping Brazilian law became a
powerful weapon to protect national industry from unfair practices of trade.
The reason for that, of course, was the implementation of the program for the reduction of
ordinary duties, as mentioned above, which made the national industry suddenly vulnerable
in the face of international competition.
In its article 2, the Decreto 93.941 gave discretionary power to the Comissdo de
Politica Aduaneira (CPA) for the regulation of the administrative procedures necessary for
the implementation of both the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes in Brazil. The CPA,
therefore, enacted Resolugdo 1 .227/87.
The Resolugdo 1 .227
Resolugdo 1.227 is a regulatory instrument with 54 articles, covering all the
necessary steps for the imposition of anti-dumping and, also, countervailing duties.
Indeed, the procedures for the petitionary, consultative and investigative processes,
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application of provisional measures, and others, are fully covered in its text, and it could be
considered a perfect document if a monumental mistake had been avoided: in its two first
articles, the Resolution classifies antidumping and countervailing duties as additional to the
ordinary import duty. As a matter of fact, such a definition constitutes, at the least, a total
extrapolation of the discretionary power given by Decreto 93.941, on the grounds that the
CPA was not supposed to have competence for the definition of the legal nature of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties. Article 1, ipsi Uteris, states that the anti-dumping and
countervailing duties constitute an additional import duty26 . Article 2 reinforces the
definition
27
.
Before commenting on the chaotic effects produced by such an erroneous
classification for anti-dumping penalties, it would be helpful to understand the reasons that
led the CPA to do that. Apparently, the mistake can be explained by the precedent existent
in Law 3.244, which was, as we mentioned before28 , the first Brazilian legislation to deal
with dumping. Indeed, by Law 3.244 the remedy for the neutralization of dumping
practices was the mere adjustment (increase) of the ordinary import duty, since there was
no specific legislation with previsions for the applicability of anti-dumping penalties, as
practiced all over the world.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, we emphasized the legal distinctions between ordinary
import duties and anti-dumping duties29 , showing that these two institutes are completely
different and, thus, must not be confused. Unfortunately, at a moment when Brazil was
inaugurating its first specific anti-dumping legislation, a wrongful definition such as the
one made by the CPA created obstacles for the full application of the Antidumping Code in
Brazil.
The Problem of the Application of Retroactive Effects
As mentioned before in this paper, we consider the possibility of the application of
retroactive effects as one of the most powerful weapons of the Antidumping Code. In a
world where information travels at vertiginous velocity, it is very difficult to conceive
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dumping being practiced for a long period of time. As we have already mentioned in
Chapter 1, dumping is more likely to occur nowadays in sporadic shots or even in short
term transactions (intermittent), since the nations, at least the GAIT members, would be
ready enough to repeal dumping well before it could reach the category of long term
dumping. By the provisions of the Antidumping Code30 it is possible that anti-dumping
duties can be levied retroactively for the period covering 90 days prior to the application of
provisional measures, its application being limited to the date of initiation of the
investigation.
However, in order to to do that, i.e., to apply retroactive anti-dumping penalties,
two pre-requisites have to be met: a) the importer should be aware that dumping was being
practiced; and b) the injury to the local industry was caused by massive dumping of imports
over a relatively short period of time. Pre-requisite "a)" seems to be easy to meet, given its
subjective character. Also, the practice of dumping foreseen in "b)" is more likely to occur
for the reasons given in the paragraph above, i.e., the dumping of huge volumes of goods
practiced for a short period of time.
On the other hand, if the applicability of retroactive effects did not exist, one can
assume that dumping could be practiced for almost the whole period in which an anti-
dumping investigation was taking place, with the exception of the period eventually
protected by the application of provisional measures. Such a situation would create a
perfect environment for the discharge of eventual dumped surplus, even after the beginning
of an investigation process, granting to the exporter/importer the comfortable situation of
avoiding undesirable extra-duties. In order for this to happen, it would be enough for the
exporter/importer to have access to the investigation process, by which he would be aware
of when the imposition of definitive duties would probably be established.
This introduction was made in order to explain the situation that was created in
Brazil, when the CPA classified anti-dumping duties as being additional to the ordinary
import duty. In Brazil, there is strong jurisprudence establishing that import duties can
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never be applied retroactively. Ordinary import duties in Brazil are regulated by the Decreto
61.574/67, and it established that the fact that generates the levy of an import duty is its
entry in the country
31
. It is on these grounds that the jurisprudence prevalent in Brazil
rejects the possibility of having ordinary import duties applied retroactively.
Consequently, in spite of the fact that in article 1 1 of Decreto 93.941 (the Brazilian
Antidumping Code) there were previsions for the applicability of retroactive effects, as
foreseen in the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code, the erroneous definition for anti-
dumping duties given by the Resolucdo CPA- 1.227 made its application impossible.
Interestingly enough, in article 47 of Resolution 1.227 there was a provision establishing
that anti-dumping duties would apply only to imports occurring after the definitive
imposition of anti-dumping penalties, with the exception foreseen in article 1 1 of Decreto
93.941.
Consequently, in all the cases where the imposition of definitive anti-dumping
duties was decided, the effects applied only over imports occurring after the publication of
the authorities' decision in the Didrio Oficial.
Asa matter of fact, it would be extremely easy to solve the question through a
declaratory action that could be provoked to declare the legal nature of anti-dumping duties.
However, matters involving dumping in Brazil have been characterized by a delicate
diplomacy among government on the one side, and industries and importers on the other
side. The main reason for that is based on the principle that the imposition of anti-dumping
duties is a matter of government discretionary power, i.e., the government can always
decide for the non-application of penalties, even when the dumping practice is proved.
Therefore, no one would take the position of challenging a governmental decision, since it
would create a conflict that could cause future problems. Actually, Brazil still has to learn
how to live in a democratic system.
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The Current Law
After the Uruguay Round, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
including understandings and the so-called Marrakech Protocol, was introduced in
Brazilian Law by Decreto 1.305 in December 12, 1994.
On March 30, 1995, Congress passed Law 9.019, which deals with the application
of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as conceived in the Uruguay Round. What is
curious about Law 9.019 is that, in its unique paragraph, article 1 states that antidumping
and countervailing duties have neither a tributary nature nor a relation with the levy of
ordinary import duties32 . Indeed, for those who are not familiar with the problems created
by the CPA's definition of anti-dumping duties through Resolution 1.227, such a concern
about the legal nature of anti-dumping duties in article 1 of the new law sounds really
awkward.
As a matter of fact, the explanation about the anti-dumping legal nature in the body
of the law it seems to be totally unnecessary. Indeed, the distinction between anti-dumping
penalties and ordinary import duties is elementary, as mentioned before. It would have
been enough, we think, to eliminate the erroneous definition in articles 2 and 3 of the
CPA's Resolution, and no one would have doubt about the legal nature of anti-dumping
duties.
Actually, in spite of the fact that the Comissdo de Politico. Aduaneira does not exist
anymore, article 12 of Law 9.019 reaffirms the provisions related to the anti-dumping
administrative process procedures defined in Resolution CPA 1227, whenever, of course,
it does not conflict with Law 9.019.
Therefore, there is no problem anymore for the application of retroactive effects of
anti-dumping penalties in Brazil, though until now no case has been registered case in
which the application of retroactive effects took place.
The complementary current Brazilian legislation dealing with dumping,
countervailing, and safeguards is as follows:
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Regulamentos (Regulatory Laws)
- Antidumping Agreement - Decrcto 1.602 (August 23, 1995).
- Subsidies Agreement - Decreto 1.751, (Deeember 19, 1995).
- Safeguards Agreement - Decreto 1.488, (May 11, 1995).
These agreements are an incorporation into Brazilian law of the co-related
agreements generated in the GATT Uruguay Round.
Law 9.019 -Highlights
Article 5 gives to the Secretaria de Comercio Exterior - SECEX (Foreign Commerce
Secretariat) of the Ministerio de lndustria e Comercio (Ministry of Industry and Commerce)
the competence for the conduct of the administrative process and the determinig of the
existence of dumping, margin of dumping, injury (or the threat of injury) to the domestic
industry
,
and the causal link between dumping and injury.
Article 7 establishes that the Ministerio da Fazenda (Ministry of Finance) shall be
competent to levy anti-dumping duties.
Article 6 states that the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties,
provisional or definitive, must be established through an inter-ministerial "Portaria'XAct).
This means that any federal act deciding for the imposition of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties has to be signed both by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of
Industry and Commerce.
Article 8 foresees the possibility of the application of retroactive effects of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties. Article 1 1 establishes that the Ministers of Finance and
Industry and Commerce can enact procedures complementary to the law.
Decreto 1.602 (Acordo Antidumping)
As mentioned before, Decreto 1.602/9533 (Acordo Antidumping) is a quasi-
translation, whenever possible, of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code, introducing in
the Brazilian law the adjustments decided in the Uruguay Round.
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However. Decreto 1.602 does not repeat the provisions of
:
Round
Antidumping Code for revision of decisions imposing anti-dumping duties. Indeed, the
provisions for "Judicial Re . article 1 3 of the GATT Antidumping Code; and for
"Consultation and Dispute Settlement* (article 17; are not present in the Brazilian Acordo
::dw?iping. This can be explained on the grounds that Decre:o 1 .602 just makes pu~ I
"the rules of the game'", i.e.. the conditions and procedures necessary for the adi
and conduct of an anti-dumping administrative proce-
Nevertheless, an eventual prevision of judicial re vie •• in die A rd Antidumping
would be redundant, since such a possibility ; dtutesa principle protected by the
Brazilian Constitution". Furthermore, the absence fanicte 17 of the Antidumping C
in the Acordo Antidumping can be explained by the fact that only a Member-Stale : : the
GATT '"WTO can address a matter to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO5, winch
means that it does not constitute a private right.
C - Brazilian Agencies in Charge : International Cornrne:. e
Ministry of Industry and Commerce
- Secretaria de Comercio Exterior i SECEX - Created ? . Decreto 1.757 in December 22
1995. the SECEX is the organ responsible for the formulation and prop: f foreign
commercial policies. It also suggests parameters for the imposition of ordinary import
duties. As mentioned before, the SECEX has competence for the conduct of the
administrative process and for determ; : g fence of dumping. . largni
dumping; ... the injury :::-. . rjur : tbed mesric industry thecal
link between dumping and injur;.
- Departamento de Defesa Comercial (Commercial Defense Department) - The DDC is an
organ subordinated to the SECEX. and :: is actual]} asibte agenc for the conduct
of the administrative process tor the imposition of anti-dumping dune v r . force rfthe
Circular-SECEX n 73, of September 12, 1995. The s neC sstat
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procedures for beginning an anti-dumping investigative process. Therefore, a petition for
the initiation of an anti-dumping process must be directed to the Departamento de Defesa
Comercial*1
- Comite Consultivo de Defesa Comercial (Commercial Defense Consultative Committee) -
The CCDC is a consultative group presided by the Secretary of the SECEX. The group is
composed of representatives of the Ministerio da Fazenda (Ministry of Finance),
Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations), Ministerio da
Agricultura, Abastecimento e Reforma Agrdria (Ministry of Agriculture, Supply and
Agrarian Reform), Ministerio do Planejamento e Orcamento (Ministry of Planning and
Budget), and by members of the executive secretary of the Cdmara de Comercio Exterior
(Chamber of Foreign Commerce). The CCDC is the organ able to make recommendations
related to all the steps of the administrative process, such as recommendations for the
beginning or terminus of an investigative process, applicability of provisional or definitive
anti-dumping duties measures, retroactivity, etc. 38
- Departamento de Operagoes de Comercio Exterior (Foreign Commerce Operations
Department) The DOCE is the agency in charge of the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of statistical information related to foreign commerce. It is also the DOCE
which authorizes imports and exports. This organ is subordinated to the SECEX.
- Departamento de Negociagoes Internacionais (International Negotiations Department)
Subordinated to the SECEX, the DNI is responsible for the technical preparation of
international negotiations in the ambit of WTO, MERCOSUL, and ALADI. Therefore, it is
the DNI which analyzes requests for the increase or decrease of ordinary import duties.
- Departamento de Politica Comercial Exterior (Foreign Commerce Policy Department) The
DPCE is the agency in charge of i) accompanying the execution of governmental policies
and programs related with foreign commerce, and ii) suggesting governmental actions in
matters involving foreign commerce. The DPCE is also subordinated to the SECEX.
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- Cdmara de Comercio Exterior (Foreign Commerce Chamber) This agency was created
by Decreto 1.386 on February 6, 1995, and it is an inter-ministry group responsible for the
coordination of activities related to foreign commerce. The group is presided over by the
Ministro Chefe da Casa Civil da Presidencia da Repiiblica (Chief Civilian Minister of the
Presidency).
Ministry of Finance
- Secretaria da Receita Federal (Federal Revenue Secretariat) The SRF is the agency
responsible for the control and administration of federal taxes. It includes the levy of
ordinary import duties, and anti-dumping and countervailing duties. It also controls imports
and exports of goods in the country.
- Banco Central do Brasil (Brazilian Central Bank) The BACEN controls the entry, exit,
and convertibility of foreign currencies in Brazil.
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Medietas Compensatorias, at 63 (1996).
2 - Id., at 64.
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4 - Id., at 53. "A industria textil tinha-se iniciado no Pais em 1850, atingindo, em 1885-
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"The textile industry which started in 1850, reached 60 per cent of the domestic demand
between 1885-1890 and, during the World War I period, it was able to supply the totality
of the local market".
5 - Id., at 53,54. "No ano de 1900, a industria brasileira comegou a ser fortemente
protegida atraves de tarifas alfandegarias, que, no caso de certas roupas de algodao,
atinjiram o montante de 314%, sem duvida uma das mais altas do mundo".
"In 1900, Brazilian industry started being strongly protected by import duties. Cotton
clothes, for instance, were charged with an import duty of 314 per cent, which was without
doubt one of the highest duties in the world."
6 - Id., at 53.
7 - Guedes, Josefina Maria M.M., and Pinheiro, Silvia M., op.cit., at 64.
8 - Real de Aziia, Daniel E., op. cit., at 55.
9 - Id. "As medidas tomadas trouxeram resultado imediato: as importagoes cafram pela
metade e se estagnaram durante cinco anos. Para os setores de ago e cimento, cujas
atividades tinham comegado alguns anos antes, o novo sistema de protegao tornou-se vital
v
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"The measures taken by the government brought an immediate result: The imports dropped
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1930 o pais deu initio ao seu processo de industrializagao. A produgao industrial cresceu,
atraves de uma utilizagao intensiva dos equipamentos ja instalados e da importagao de
outros, geralmente provenientes de industrias americanas atingidas pela crise."
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"It was in 1930 that the country initiated its process of industrialization. The national
industrial production increased through the intense utilization of equipments already
installed, and through the purchase of new equipment imported mainly from American
companies that had been affected by the crisis."
1
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-
- Real de Azua, Daniel E., op. cit., at 56.
12 - Id. "A politica errada continuou ainda durante a guerra da Coreia, quando o preco do
cafe aumentou alem do previsto, facilitando ainda mais a politica de importacoes
desnecessarias. O Brasil, assim como outros pafses latino-americanos, malograram suas
duas grandes oportunidades historicas. Situacoes tao favoraveis como as que se
apresentaram nos dois periodos de pos-guerra dificilmente voltarao a se repetir."
"The wrongful policy remained in force until the Korean War, when the price of coffee
increased significantly, and unnecessary imports were made. Brazil, as well as other Latin-
American countries, lost two great historical opportunities. It is very unlikely that such
favorable situations will occur again."
13 - Guedes, Josefina Maria M.M., and Pinheiro, Silvia M, op.cit., at 66. "O periodo
entre 1956 e 1961 caracterizou-se por dois fatores mais destacados: o aumento da
participacao governamental direta e indireta nos investimentos, e a entrada de capital
estrangeiro privado e oficial no Pais. Nesse periodo, teve lugar a instalacao de algumas
industrias dinamicas, como a automobilfstica, de construcao naval, de material eletrico
pesado e outras industrias mecanicas e de bens de capital."
"The period between 1956 and 1961 was characterized by two main factors: the increase of
direct and indirect governmental participation in investments, and the entry of private and
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14 - See Chapter 1 supra, at 16-19.
15 - Guedes, Josefina Maria M.M., and Pinheiro, Silvia M., op. cit., at 69.
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substitutivas, impossibilitadas de competir no mercado exterior, foram em grande parte
instaladas com ajuda do capital estrangeiro, que, obviamente, teve de ser reembolsado
atraves da remessa de royalties."
"...what happened was the typical phenomenon that occurs whenever the process of the
substitution of imports is based exclusively on the protection of tariff barriers, i.e., after
supplying the total demand of the domestic market, domestic industries experienced a
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installed with the support of foreign capital, which had to be reimbursed through the
consignment of royalties."
19 - Campos, Roberto, op. cit., at 955. " O proprio president Geisel utilizaria a expressao
"democracia relativa" para se referir "a situagao brasileira."
" President Geisel himself used to utilize the expression "relative democracy" in referring to
the Brazilian situation."
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"Among the four possible measures for solving the balance of payment problem -
substitution of imports, foreign financing, enlargement of the exports, and reduction of the
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21 - Campos, Roberto, op.cit., at 1 172.
22 - Id.
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1992, for corruption. However, in his government the concept of a liberal and open
economy was applied. In addition to the program for the reduction of trade barriers,
another remarkable decision was the implementation of a strong privatization program (Law
8.031/90).
24 - During the same year, Congress also promulgated Decreto 93.962, which brought into
Brazilian law the Agreement on Implementation of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Subsidies Code).
25 - Comissao de Politica Aduaneira (CPA), Process # 10768.005376/88-15. Resolucao
CPA 00-1606/89, Published in the "Diario Oficial da Uniao" in April 19, 1989.
26 - Resolucao CPA - 1227/89 - "Artigo I - Os direitos antidumping e compensatdrio
definitivos, de que tratam os Acordos Antidumping e de Subsidios e Direitos
Compensatorios, constituent imposto de importacdo adicional."
"Article 1 - The definitive antidumping and countervailing rights, referred to in the
Antidumping and Subsidies Codes, constitute an additional import tax."
27 - Id., "Artigo 2 - A Comissao de Politica Aduaneira (CPA) estabelecerd o imposto the
importaqdo adicional a que se refere o artigo 1 , e definird os termos, limites e condiqoes de
sua aplicacdo.
Pardgrafo unico - O imposto de importacdo adicional sera calculado mediante a aplicaqdo de
aliquota ad valorem, fixada pela CPA, sobre o valor aduaneiro da mercadoria."
"Article 2 - The Comissao de Politica Aduaneira (CPA) shall establish the additional import
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Paragraph 1 - The additional import duty, to be fixed by the CPA, shall be calculated and
applied through ad valorem criteria over the customs value of the goods."
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Chapter 4
A - Dumping in the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1816
In the early 1800s, England was exporting huge volumes of goods to the United
States "without waiting for orders and (the goods) were sold by agents in the ordinary way
of auction for whatever prices they would bring. 1 " Such a speculative practice, which was
interpreted as an evidence "that the primary purpose of the English exports to the United
States had been to destroy the newly developed American manufacturing industries2", led
to the enactment of the first protectionist law in the United States, the Tariff Act of 1816.
U.S. Antitrust Laws
In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act 3 . Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, "whenever pricing is a basis for a challenge as attempted monopolization, it
is established that such price must be predatory
4
." However, the Sherman Act must be
considered as an American law designed to repeal domestic unfair practices of commerce
rather than to repeal dumping practices from abroad.
Indeed, in deciding American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 5 , the Supreme
Court stated that "(A) conspiracy in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not
draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful if they are permitted by the local law."
The Court, therefore, refused to validate the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act,
on the grounds that the law did not contain an express provision for such application6 .
Moreover, under the generally accepted characterization of dumping, predatory
price is not to be condemned by itself. It is possible to assume, for instance, that an
intentional attempt to monopolize through predatory-pricing will not be repealed under anti-
dumping laws, as long as the export price, even being a predatory one, is not lower than
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the domestic price in the exporting country. In this sense, the Robinson-Patman Act7
,
which was passed by Congress in 1936, is more concerned with anti-dumping laws, in that
it deals with price-discrimination rather than with predatory-pricing. However, Rainer M.
Bierwagen points out fundamental distinctions between the Robinson-Patman Act and anti-
dumping laws, as follows:
"i) - Price comparisons under the antidumping law are made on an ex-factory basis, not on
the basis of actual selling price;
ii) - Antidumping is concerned with primary line injury, i.e., injury to competitors.
Secondary line injury, i.e., injury to competitors of the U.S. purchasers of the dumped
product, is not considered;
iii) - The injury standard, a 'harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant', is significantly lower in antidumping and not directed to take competition as
such into account;
iv) - Product differences may lead to different results: due allowance under Robinson-
Patman but not under the antidumping statute;
v) - To meet an equally low price is usually irrelevant under antidumping law. Also, no
basis is in antidumping for permitting distress sales, and sales to move obsolete inventory.
Prices quoted are not actual prices but based on an investigation covering typically six
months in the past;
vi) - Potential differences lie in the notion of like and competitive product. This may lead to
a finding of (no) dumping and/or adjustments for physical differences 8 ."
Furthermore, the Robinson-Patman presents the same problems for its
extraterritorial application, and it must be seen as a domestic antitrust law rather than as an
antidumping law.
There are American scholars who defend the principle that anti-dumping laws are
redundant, on the grounds that domestic anti-trust laws would be good enough to repel
foreign practices of dumping9 . We do not agree. The idea of having an uniform anti-
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dumping code, the GATT Antidumping Code, means, above all, international commitment.
If countries started applying their domestic anti-trust laws against unfair practices of trade
from abroad, areas of conflict would be unavoidable such as, for instance, problems with
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of domestic laws abroad or, even, the spread
of over-protectionist laws that could arise in differing domestic legislation. At least we
understand that it would conspire against the current effort for the globalization of the
international market.
Tariff Act of 1894
Also known as the "Wilson Tariff Act, Section 73 of the Tariff Act of 1 894 "makes
unlawful every conspiracy, combination, etc., of persons or corporations when any of
them is engaged in importing articles into the United States and when such conspiracy or
combination is intended to operate in restrain of lawful trade or to increase the market price
in the United States of any imported article or of any manufacture of such article. 10'
However, "except for the unimportant difference in the penalties provided, it does not
appear.. .that Section 73 of the Wilson Act added anything to the Sherman Act. 11 "
Revenue Act of 1916
The Revenue Act of 1916 12 marked the first attempt to provide specific anti-
dumping legislation in the United States, in order to control the dumping of imports into the
country. During World War I, "the disclosure of the unfair methods of competition, and
above all the practice of predatory dumping, which has supposedly been widely prevalent
in the export trade of foreign countries - and specially Germany - led to a widespread
demand in the United States for more effective protection to American industries against
such unfair foreign competition. 13"
By utilization of the same principle present in the Canadian Antidumping Law 14
,
Sections 800-801 of the Revenue Act consider unlawful the import in the United States of
any article at a price "substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of
such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the
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country of their production, or of other foreign countries to which they are commonly
exported...
15
", which means the introduction of the "normal value" criteria for the
characterization of dumping. In addition, under this act it is not necessary to prove material
injury in the local industry in order to consider the import as unlawful. It is necessary,
nevertheless, to prove that "such act or acts be done with intent of destroying or injuring an
industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the
United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such
articles in the United States. 16" Consequently, "while there is no need to show injury per
se, it is necessary to prove predatory intent", which is "exceedingly difficult to meet" and,
therefore "there has never been a successful prosecution under the 1916 Act. 17
'
Another criticism of the anti-dumping provision of the 1916 Act, was made on the
grounds that "in confining its penalties to the common and systematic practice of predatory
dumping it fails to provide remedies against sporadic dumping even though predatory in
character and against other types of dumping which may be injurious to American industry
though not predatory in intent or not probable to be so. 18
"
As a matter of fact, it is possible to assume that the 1916 Act was really designed as
an anti-trust law.
Antidumping Act of 1921
The Antidumping Act of 1921 is found in Title II of the Emergency Tariff Act of
1921 19 . The Act establishes that the investigative Anti-dumping process is conducted by
the Secretary of the Treasury, who decides when "an industry in the United States was
being or was likely to be injured or was prevented from being established by such
dumping. 20"
Unlike its predecessor, the Antidumping Act does not require the finding of
predatory intent, it being enough the proof to prove the causal link between less than fair
value sales and injury to the domestic industry. Moreover, for the first time an anti-
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dumping legislation was being effective and, "(U)p to the end of 1922 the Secretary of the
Treasury had made findings with respect to some twenty commodities. 21 "
The Antidumping Act of 1921 "was seen in comparison with the Canadian
legislation of 1904 and not in the light of anti-trust. 22" However, the legislative history of
the Act "clearly demonstrated that the Congress only sought to control predatory dumping
and not every instance of price discrimination. 23"
B - The Current U.S. Anti-Dumping Law
Trade Agreements Act of 197924
The Antidumping Act of 1921, "remained the principal statutory basis for anti-
dumping actions until it was repealed in 1979 in the wake of the Tokyo Round Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade25", the
Tokyo Round Antidumping Code.
As observed by Raj Bhala, the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code "required
significant changes in U.S. antidumping law which were implemented by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979. These changes took the form of amendments to Title VII of the
1930 Act, and it established the current framework for anti-dumping procedures in the
United States. 26"
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, inter alia, provides:
1) more expeditious administrative proceedings;
2) the formalization of review proceedings;
3) the expansion of the role of the International Trade Commission;
4) a great public participation in proceedings;
5) for greater detail concerning the suspension of investigations27 .
Moreover, the Act establishes that two different U.S. federal agencies are in charge
of antidumping procedures, the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the International
Trade Commission (ITC). The DOC is responsible for determining whether "a class or
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kind of foreign merchandise is being or likely to be sold in U.S. at less than its fair
value.
2X
" The 1TC, on the other hand, is responsible in determining that, due to imports at
less than fair value, an American industry has been: i) materially injured, ii) threatened with
material injury, or iii) that the establishment of an industry in the U.S. has been materially
retarded29 .
Therefore, if both the DOC's final dumping determination, and the ITC's final
injury determination are affirmative, then the DOC issues an anti-dumping order.
Trade and Tariff Act of 198430
Significant amendments were introduced by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
which were designed to:
"a) assist small U.S. business and petitioners generally by reducing the complexity and
cost of antidumping proceedings;
b) clarify the scope of antidumping laws;
c) expand the authority of the Commerce Department in addressing certain discrete
situations, including persistent dumping and the utilization of certain calculation
techniques. 31
"
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 32
Article 12 of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code established a mechanism by
which special anti-dumping actions can be taken on behalf of a third country. To clarify the
mechanism, it applies to a situation as the following: Country A is dumping a certain
product in Country B; Country C (the third country), however, also exports the same
product to Country B and, therefore, the domestic industry in Country C is being injured
by such dumping. Consequently, Country C is entitled to formally request Country B to
proceed to an anti-dumping investigation against Country A. The implementation of the
mechanism is possible whenever countries B and C are member- states of the GATT. It is
not necessary that Country A be a member of the GATT.
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Interestingly enough, the possibility of taking anti-dumping actions on behalf of a
third country was introduced in the U.S. law through the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
33
,
becoming Subtitle D of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 771, |7| iii) Effects of
Dumping in Third-Country Markets).
However, with the advent of the Omnibus and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the
legal language dealing with the issue "anti-dumping actions on behalf of the United States"
became substantially stronger than that adopted in article 12 of the Antidumping Code.
Indeed, where in article 12, paragraph 4, of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code it is
established that "(T)he decision whether or not to proceed with a case shall rest with the
importing country...", Section 1317, (e), of the 1988 Act states that "if the appropriate
authority of an Agreement country refuses to undertake antidumping measures (by request
of the United States). ..the Trade Representative shall promptly consult with the domestic
industry on whether action under any law of the United States law is appropriate. 34
'
Further, the meaning of the U.S. law can be interpreted in the sense that it is not
enough that the authority in the importing country starts an anti-dumping investigation
when requested by a third country; by the U.S. law it is necessary, in fact, to "undertake
antidumping measures" which, at least, withdraws from the importing country's authority
the discretionary power to decide whether or not dumping is taking place. The American
law expresses, as a matter of fact, the possibility of unilateral retaliation, which is
inconsistent with the GATT/WTO rules
, as we will analyze below. Such a possibility, we
believe, is also inconsistent with elementary principles of sovereignty.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act 35
The Uruguay Round Antidumping Code, as well as the other Uruguay Round
Agreements, was ratified by Congress in December, 1994 36 . The most important feature of
the current Antidumping Code is the introduction of dispute settlement procedures, "which
strengthen the ability of governments to challenge antidumping actions by other member
nations.
37"
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The new framework required changes in U.S. anti-dumping laws in order to
accommodate:
1) a five years sunset review
38
;
2) new adjustments for startup costs;
3) new standards for de minimis margins of dumping;
4 ) more detailed treatment of the methodology used in analyzing certain injuries and
dumping factors 39 .
Another important aspect is that until the Uruguay Round the Antidumping Code
did not bind all the GATT members, but only those countries who ratified the Code. Now,
all members are bound. Indeed, article 1
,
paragraph 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization states that "(T)he agreements and associated
legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (the Multilateral Trade Agreements) are
integral part of this Agreement, binding on all Members."
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the provisions for antidumping investigation
on behalf of a third country have been altered in order to accommodate the current article 14
of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code, the provisions foreseen in the above mentioned
Section 1317 (e) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (unilateral
retaliation) remain in effect40 .
As noticed by Raj Bhala, "(T)he 1994 Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement
and Uruguay Round Agreements Act supersede the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code and
the 1979 Act amendments, respectively. Given the difficulty of meeting the intent
requirement of the 1916 Act, the 1930 Act, as amended, is by far the most important U.S.
antidumping statute. 41 "
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C - U.S. Laws and the Rules of the GATT/WTO
Conflicts
President Harry Truman signed the original GATT in 1947, under the authority of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 which was extended in 199442 . However,
Truman never submitted the agreement for Senate approval43 , which means that the GATT
1947 could never be considered the "Law of the Land" as defined by the Constitution of the
United States44 . Consequently, whenever it was possible to identify a potential conflict
between the GATT Agreement and an U.S. law, the latter would always prevail.
In fact, it was only in September 1994, i.e., almost fifty years after the advent of
the original GATT 1947, that President Clinton submitted to the Senate the GATT/WTO
Agreements as conceived in the Uruguay Round, which include, of course, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (as amended and including notes and supplementary
provisions) and the Uruguay Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. The approval was given by the Senate in December, 1994.
Therefore, through the Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements45 , one
could assume that the GATTAVTO Agreements became also the "Law of the Land", and
eventual conflicts of laws would supposedly be the object of the same criteria utilized to
solve domestic conflicts of laws as, for instance, the "last in time" principle.
Unfortunately, this is not true. In ratifying the GATT/WTO Agreements, the
Senate made very clear that these Agreements will never preempt U.S. domestic laws.
Indeed, Section 3512 (Relationship of the Agreements to the United States law and State
law) establishes that "(N)o provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with
any law of the United States shall have effect.46"
Also, Section 3512 determines that "(U)pon the enactment of this Act [enacted Dec.
8, 1994] the President shall, through the intergovernmental policy advisory committees on
trade ...consult with the States for the purpose of achieving conformity of States laws and
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practices with the Uruguay Round Agreements.47 ' This means that whenever the Uruguay
Round Agreements are in conflict with a state law, the state law will prevail until (and if)
the aforementioned committee decides to advise the states to seek conformity, which seems
very unlikely to occur.
Consequently, one can assume that Congress introduced the Uruguay Round
Agreements into the U.S. law not as an "International Treaty" but, rather, as an
"International Agreement." Such a technical distinction creates a contradictory legal
situation whereby the Uruguay Round Agreements will always be susceptible to
preemption by American laws, even though these agreements are now supposed to be
considered as U.S. domestic law.
Section 301
The above mentioned Section 3512 of the Implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreements also establishes that the Uruguay Round Agreements shall not "...limit any
authority conferred under any law of the United States, including Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974..
,
48"
Section 30
1
49
of the Trade Act of 1974 has been the object of the most severe
criticism by the GATT members, according to the argument that Section 301 is a
mechanism for the implementation of unilateral retaliation, a remedy that is totally
inconsistent with, and condemned by, the GATT/WTO Agreements. As matter of fact,
Section 301 has been considered as "the most potent and controversial weapon in the U.S.
trade remedy arsenal.50"
By Section 301 the President of the United States can take unilateral measures
against unfair practices of trade from foreign countries whenever "the rights of the United
States under any trade agreement are being denied; 51 " or "an act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country (i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies
benefits to the United States under any agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts United States commerce; 52"
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Among the actions authorized by Section 301, the United States can, for instance
unilaterally impose duties or any other import restrictions on the import goods, which
includes the possibility of adopting quantitative restriction (quotas) for imports. However,
in order to remedy unfair practices of trade, any import restriction other than tariff barriers
(anti-dumping and countervailing duties) is rejected by the GATT/WTO Agreements.
Consequently, it is possible to assume, for instance, that the United States would
be technically and legally capable of adopting unilateral quantitative restrictions on imports
to remedy dumping practice from abroad, as long as Section 301 could be utilized to
preempt the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code as introduced into the U.S. law by
Congress.
Furthermore, when Section 1317, (e), of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 (third country dumping)53 states that "if the appropriate authority of an
Agreement country refuses to undertake antidumping measures ...the Trade Representative
shall promptly consult with the domestic industry on whether action under any law of the
United States law is appropriate .. .", it is obvious that such a proviso, which sounds like a
threat, hides the possibility of utilization of Section 301
.
Curiously, Congress tried to accommodate Section 301 and Uruguay Round
Agreements through the introduction in Section 301 of a mechanism by which the Section
will not be utilized if the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO "has adopted a
report, or a ruling issued under the formal dispute settlement proceeding...54'' However, it
goes farther and establishes that such an exception will be applied as long as "the rights of
the United States under a trade Agreement are not being denied, or the act, policy or
practice - (I) is not a violation of, or inconsistent with, the rights of the United States, or
(II) does not deny, nullify, or impair benefits to the United States under any trade
agreement...
55 "
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Thus, the interpretative power to find whether or not the United States commercial
interests are being threatened relies on the discretion of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR).
Additionally, there is no prevision in Section 301 concerning judicial review, and
"it could be inferred that Congress did not want Section 301 determinations to be
reviewed. 56"
Nevertheless, we have to recognize the strong political character of Section 301
.
Historically, the President of the United States has carried the authority to promote
unilateral retaliation against discriminatory foreign trade. Indeed, "President George
Washington was empowered by statute to lay embargoes and other restrictions on imports
and exports whenever he felt that foreign countries were discriminating against the United
States.
57
" Perhaps, then it is possible to find in historical precedents the explanation for the
Senate's delay in approving the GATT 1947.
On the other hand, in spite of the fact that since its creation in 1974, "... the USTR
has undertaken roughly 100 Section 301 investigation858 ", we assume that such a number is
more likely to be reduced after the introduction of the Uruguay Round Agreements into the
U.S.
Even considering the lower status that was given by Congress to the Uruguay
Round Agreements in the ambit of American laws, we can expect that the United States will
try to avoid, whenever possible, areas of conflict with the World Trade Organization, in as
much as the harmonization of the world market is the main goal to be achieved in these
times of world trade globalization.
Final Comment
We finalize this paper with some personal thoughts as to what eould be the
evolution of anti-dumping laws in the future.
There are many scholars who criticize anti-dumping laws for several reasons. As a
matter of fact, the issue "dumping" in the GATT has been the object of a permanent
controversy. The number of people who defend its total elimination is not small, based on
the idea that, since anti-dumping laws have a protectionist character, they should be
withdrawn from the GATT. Therefore, the great challenge of anti-dumping laws is the
minimization of protectionist abuse, which can be done through a permanent improvement
of anti-dumping laws in order to "differentiate the protectionist abuser from the meritorious
petitioner...
59"
Further, the fabulous arsenal introduced into the GATT by the advent of the
"Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes", certainly tends to inhibit future protectionist and abusive utilization of anti-
dumping laws.
One of the most common attacks is made under the allegation that anti-dumping
laws, far from protecting citizens, are elaborated only to protect industry. Such an
allegation is made on the grounds that the citizens of the importing country would always
be favored by the low dumped prices of imported goods.
We do not agree. Economically, it is not easy to justify the fact of having a country
exporting products at lower prices than those existent in its own market. Furthermore,
although it is true that dumping can benefit citizens in the importing country, a rigorous and
neutral anti-dumping policy can favor, on the other hand, the citizens of the exporting
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country (or even the citizens of a third country, in the absence of a domestic price).
Indeed, it is possible to imagine a nearly Utopian situation where the exporting country
would have to lower its domestic prices in order to be able to export its products.
Another common criticism is that anti-dumping laws are redundant as long as
domestic anti-trust laws would be good enough to repeal dumping practices from abroad.
Again we do not agree, for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 3 supra60 , which are based on
two basic concepts. First, there are problems with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
domestic anti-trust laws. Indeed, it has to be observed that, unlike what occurs under anti-
dumping laws, anti-trust laws punish the seller, i.e., the active agent of the practice of
predatory or discriminatory pricing. Second, there is a lack of international commitment to
anti-trust laws, which could lead to international conflict about different domestic
legislation, and also to the proliferation of protectionist and abusive laws.
However, what could be the future of anti-dumping laws? We believe that the key-
word for the issue "anti-dumping law" is prophylaxis. Therefore, the permanent
improvement of the Antidumping Code through mechanisms to prevent the practice of
dumping is the challenge for the future.
In order to make preventing dumping more effective, maybe some principles of
anti-trust laws could be brought into the Code. For, instance, the current system
established in the Antidumping Code, by which the imposition of anti-dumping penalties is
limited, at the maximum (and under special situations61 ), for the imports occurred in the
period after the start of the investigative process, could be changed. Indeed, sporadic
dumping, which is a very common type, can easily escape from punishment in the current
system, which can lead to a stimulation of such a practice.
An ideal situation would be, we believe, the introduction of a system by which a
dumping practice could be punished in a more effective retroactive manner, without the
limitation ruled by the Code. Maybe, the Code could establish a period of two years or so
for the prescription of the rights for the application of penalties.
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Another suggestion is related to the possibility of having the exporter also
penalized, as oeeurs in anti-trust laws. As we know, the GAIT/WTO has no power to
enforce the DSU decisions, as long as there is no international court in the WTO
framework that could do that. Maybe in the future we will see the creation of such a court.
Additionally, the GATT/WTO agreements are a matter of public law, which makes
it impossible for a WTO decision to reach a private person (the exporter) of any member-
state. However, in order to prevent dumping, the DSU could devise a special procedure by
which, whenever a dumping practice is confirmed, the WTO would apply a penalty against
the member-state in which the dumped export was made. In a second step, the penalized
member-state would pursue indemnification by suing the exporter through its domestic
legal system, perhaps by utilizing its own anti-trust laws.
However, in a free exercise of futurism, it can be imagined that the world trade
market tends to be more and more open in the future. Indeed, the expansion of regional
treaties, such as NAFTA and MERCOSUL, by the progressive inclusion of new members,
allows the conclusion that the time is not far when international commercial borders will be
totally eliminated. How long it will take, we do not know, but we guess that, when this
time comes, anti-dumping laws will still be there, maybe in the form of a huge international
anti-trust uniform code, as an essential weapon to guarantee a free and healthy market.
J
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